Эволюция позиции Итальянской Республики в отношении Украины в процессе ералихации европейской политики соседства by Вдовиченко, Вікторія Андріївна
Вікторія Вдовиченко 186 
УДК 94 (4): 327.7:325 
Victoria Vdovychenko 
PhD in History, Associate Professor  
Kyiv Borys Grinchenko University 
18/2, Bulvarno-Kudriavska Street,  




FOLLOWING CONTINUITY AND CHANGE: ITALY’S VIEW ON 
EUROPEAN NEIGHBORHOOD POLICY TOWARDS UKRAINE  
 
Current EU economic and security challenges on the territory of the EU’s 
‘ring of friends’ open a new page of its history influencing European security 
and stability framework of development. Therefore, it’s crucial to understand 
circumstances that favored to the catalyst progress of unstable neighborhoods. 
The article presents an analysis of the Italy’s position towards European 
Neighborhood Policy and the Eastern dimension of this policy — Eastern 
Partnership. A special interest is focus on its view towards Ukraine, being a 
reality-check for the European Union officials after the Revolution of Dignity, 
the illegal annexation of Crimea and the hybrid war of Russia.  
This article is presenting the ideas that ENP was created by the EU as an 
instrument for the democratization which couldn’t prevent conflicts in the 
geopolitically diverse regions. Italy, being one of the founding members of the 
European Union, was reluctant advocate a balanced approach towards the 
neighborhood regions. It merely focused on the Southern dimension of the 
ENP, almost taking apart Eastern Partnership.  
In the first part, the article demonstrates the development process of the 
ENP with a special attention that it coincided with the EU 5th enlargement 
preparation. This dualism influenced on the ENP tailoring and subsequent 
implementation. The second part focuses on the of the Italy’s opinion deve-
lopment from ENP launch till 2009 when its Eastern dimension — Eastern 
Partnership — was introduced. The third part analyzes Italy’s perception of 
Eastern Partnership and its attempts to reschedule EU’s attention to the South 
flank of the ENP in the post-Crimea annexation period.  
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ЕВОЛЮЦІЯ ПОЗИЦІЇ ІТАЛІЙСЬКОЇ РЕСПУБЛІКИ  
ЩОДО УКРАЇНИ В ПРОЦЕСІ РЕАЛІЗАЦІЇ ЄВРОПЕЙСЬКОЇ  
ПОЛІТИКИ СУСІДСТВА 
 
У статті репрезентовано погляд на еволюцію викликів, що пов’язані 
з Європейською політикою сусідства (ЄПС), та місце й роль України в 
ній. Дослідження цієї проблеми подано в контексті аналізу італомовних 
джерел та літератури, що становить особливий інтерес для розуміння 
позиції Італії щодо участі України в ЄПС та у її «східному вимірі» — 
Східному партнерстві.  
У першій частині статті показано еволюцію ЄПС із особливим 
наголосом на те, що цей процес співпав з підготовкою до 5-го розши-
рення ЄС. Другу частину присвячено еволюції сприйняття Італією полі-
тики ЄС щодо своїх сусідів у період, коли було запроваджено Східне 
партнерство. У третій частині аналізується сприйняття Італією Схід-
ного партнерства та ЄПС після незаконної анексії Криму та війни на 
Сході України. Розкривається взаємозв’язок між інтересами Італійської 
Республіки та Європейського Союзу щодо консолідованого майбутнього 
ЄС, пов’язаного з шляхами подолання безпекових загроз.  
Ключові слова: Європейська політика сусідства, Східне партнер-
ство, ЄС, Італія, Україна.  
 
Introduction 
Since the Soviet Union dissolved and the global community had a task of 
building a New Global Order, European Union made various attempts in 
transforming the countries of Eastern Europe through political and economic 
reforming assistance. Europe’s dream of building a ‘ring of friends’ surroun-
ding EU borders and, thus, protecting them, could become realistic via Euro-
pean Neighbourhood Policy launch at the beginning of the 2000s. However, 
the perspectives for the EU to view closer its Eastern and Southern neighbours 
had a cardinally different background in comparison with other integration 
projects. It can be explained that this step put in unbalance EU political 
dynamics headed by French and German axis which fostered to the political, 
economic and cultural division in the EU itself.  
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The articles aims to analyze the evolution of Italy’s role and behavior in 
what concerns its approach to Ukraine in the ENP and its Eastern dimension — 
Eastern Partnership. It stems from the need to reassess the role of the ENP 
itself in order to try to understand current challenges that European ‘ring of 
friends’ are having especially after Arab Spring, subsequent Syrian crisis (to 
the South from the EU). However, a particular importance such an analysis has 
in view of the Revolution of Dignity, the illegal annexation of Crimea and the 
hybrid war of Russia (to the East from the EU).  
This article will try to argue about three issues: 1) that ENP created by the 
EU as an instrument of neighbors democratization didn’t contribute enough in 
preventing conflicts in neighbors being drafted from enlargement process;  
2) the perception by Italy, one of the founding members of the European 
Union, of ENP and Eastern Partnership on the example of Ukraine wasn’t 
positive enough in order to understand crucial challenges it had during its path 
of democratization and reforms transformation; 3) the disputes between 
different EU member-states advocating their own interests and not focusing on 
the differences the neighbourhood regions had (Italy’s specific focus on 
Southern dimension of ENP).  
Therefore, the article is divided into three parts. In the first part, it tries to 
demonstrate the evolution of the ENP drafting with a focus that ENP coincided 
with the EU 5th enlargement preparation. The second part focuses on the 
evolution of the Italy’s perception from its launch till 2009 when Eastern 
Partnership was introduced. The third part analysis Italy’s perception of 
Eastern Partnership and its attempts to reschedule EU’s attention to the South 
flank of the ENP in the post-Crimea annexation period. 
ENP: From Enlargement to the “Ring of Friends” 
The European neighborhood policy is considered to be launched in 2003 
by the European Union before one of the biggest EU enlargements was realized 
with joining of 10 countries from Central and Eastern Europe. It was perceived 
to be a political and economic framework for presenting an alternative to those 
countries bordering the EU. Classical accounts of EU discourse were presented 
by the President of the European Commission Romano Prodi with the focus to 
circle the EU with “friendly-oriented countries”. The main idea was for EU “to 
share everything except the institutions” remaining “a pole of attraction” for its 
neighbours”1. Other positive initiatives towards creating such a circle of 
friendly-related countries were presented by Javier Solana in the European 
Strategy for Security2. 
The ENP was designed to continue on building the further path of 
democratization process regarding CEE by fostering stability and prosperity 
located on the EU’s new border after its fifth enlargement. Specifically, this 
process went far beyond the instrumental, cultural and geographic scope of 
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neighbors circle. It involves 16 countries such as Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, 
Palestine, Syria, Tunis and Ukraine.  
Following the geographic framework to analyze ENP, it was initiated by 
Great Britain oriented to the future Eastern Partnership countries (Belarus, 
Russia, Moldova, Ukraine) in 2002. However, a year later, Italy as well as 
France and Spain came with an idea to include also Mediterranean region when 
all of them had strategic interests3. However, in 2004 Georgia joined the ENP 
group and fostering Russia to come out of the neighbouring circle.  
The initiative “Wider Europe — Neighbourhood: A New Framework for 
Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours” substantially transfor-
med and supplemented the model of relations between EU and CIS formed in 
the 90s. Therefore, it is necessary to acknowledge that ENP is a unilateral EU 
initiative for the countries from Southern Mediterranean region, Middle East 
and Eastern Europe with which EU aims to develop its relations. EU places the 
mission of its neighbours’ “democratization” in order to reassure stability, 
security and prosperity of the entire European continent. The ENP interprets 
the EU’s idea to build on common interests with its partner-countries to 
cooperate jointly on key areas such as democracy promotion, rule of law, 
human rights and social cohesion4. Such a framework of operating with CEE 
countries could foster to entertain closer relations with the objective to 
reinvigorate its systemic approach of cooperation. Both processes — the 
preparation to the EU enlargement and forming of the new policy towards 
states-neighbors — has developed almost in the parallel and ended up in 2004. 
The European Commission final document, marking the end of the ENP 
process forming, was published almost in few days after EU accession of the 
10 new member-states. Therefore, in the program document approved in May 
2004, the European Commission developed an idea for its neighboring states 
aiming at presenting so-called a beneficial alternative to the accession process5.  
The ENP got interests from many scholars from Italy and other European 
countries. Priority in its evolution and rationale was given by Gwendolyn 
Sasse6, Antonio Missiroli7, Rosa Balfour8 to the importance of its implications 
and strategies — Serena Giusti9, Andreas Marchetti10 as well as its compliance 
to EU values — Sarah Poli11, legal effects — Marise Cremona and Gabriella 
Meloni12. However, some of the scholars got the idea about ENP’s merely 
benefits for Moldova and Ukraine (Benita Ferrero-Waldner13, Antonio 
Missiroli14) and whether the EU values will be followed in the ENP countries 
(Natalie Tocci)15 while others focus on the concepts of EU borders and its 
possible changes (Michele Comelli, Ettore Greco, Natalie Tocci)16. A special 
interest to the EU sanctions policy towards Russia and its impact on the Italy’s 
role in the EU analyzed Giovanna De Maio and Daniele Fattibene17. Under the 
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general title “The Crisis in Ukraine” Grianfranco Tamburelli made an overview 
of the Ukrainian current challenges in the context of the Russian aggression18. 
The perception of the Crimean annexation in accordance to the international 
law analysis was done by Antonello Tancredi19 e Maurizio Arcari20.  
In this article we rely on the importance of the Frank Schimmelfennig’s 
classification of the mechanisms of the EU impact beyond its member-states21. 
According to it, conditionality presents EU impact of the government of the 
ENP country and serves being an extra incentive in order to stick to the good 
governance principle by financial aid, market access. The priority is given to 
the importance of complying with the EU demands on capacity-building. In 
case of Ukraine as well as other Eastern Partnership countries, the model of 
positive conditionality was elaborated with annual Action Plans system. 
Moreover, F. Schimmelfennig presents here that EU will support conditionality 
principle unless its credibility is being proven22. Conditionality supports ENP 
countries to have lower expenses on the domestic implementation than EU 
assistance. This rationale of the conditionality principle received a lot of 
critique till its elaboration by the European Commission. Therefore, it was 
controversial also for the EU member-states to accept the most efficient format 
of it for the ENP. France, Germany advocated towards softer conditionality 
principle while Great Britain argued on the stronger approach. Italy followed 
its French and German partners as well as the decision of the European 
Commission towards ‘positive conditionality approach’: the more an ENP 
country conducts effective reforming process, the more assistance it will be 
granted.  
F. Schimmelfennig also explains the idea of EU socialization by which he 
understands the EU efforts to demonstrate partner countries how to fulfill EU 
policies (so-called ‘teaching process’). In such a way, EU continues to 
influence on partner countries stemming from the need for them to choose EU 
policies as being necessary for good governance conduct. This type of ‘social 
impact’ focuses merely on the constructive dialoguing and further EU policies 
complying23. However, it touches upon values to be perceived as “European” 
because socialization assumes to involve those partner countries who would 
like to identify themselves with ‘Europe’. In such a way, it explains Ukraine’s 
aspirations to follow and support European values. All other EU mechanisms 
of influence and involvement of the third countries are the varieties of 
mentioned conditionality and socialization because its impact cannot be direct-
ly seen. 
At the same time, the liaison between processes of enlargement and ENP 
development and the fact, that they were put in parallel, influenced on the 
framework and perception of the ENP itself by member-states. The majority of 
its constituent instruments, in particular the principle of political conditionality 
Еволюція позиції Італійської Республіки щодо України… 191 
and socializing were taken from the enlargement process experience. This 
phenomenon was called by Fabrizio Tassinari ‘the main peril of the ENP’ 
‘cause it leads towards further ENP ambiguity perception and vague future 
outcomes24.  
Crucial for understanding and analyzing Ukraine’s participation and 
involvement within ENP is so-called idea of participation. This principle is 
interconnected with the partnership and decentralization principle. Being 
decisive in the sectoral integration, it serves to be one more EU mechanism to 
provide assistance in the third countries. The sectoral integration offers 
opportunities for the ‘people to people’ cooperation projects in the field of 
education, science and culture25.  
Italy’s approach towards Ukraine in the ENP and Eastern Partnership 
In the view of the subsequent democratization of the European neighbours, 
foreign policy of Italy has been characterized as very flexible and variable (see 
more Vdovychenko 2015)26. Moreover, it is believed for Italy to have quite a 
low degree of influence on European decision-making process. At the same 
time, the geopolitical calculations of the influence on the ENP region as well as 
challenges related to the internal and regional conflicts in the post-cold war 
period were crucial for Italy. The EU’s position regarding the further 
“democratic anchoring of ENP countries” influenced quite positively on the 
Italian government that it started to look for its political and economic interests 
there27.  
Referring to the EU enlargement to the East, Italy’s governmental and 
opposition parties presented rather optimistic views in regard of political and 
economic importance and strategic impact of the CEE region. In its speech to 
the Senate on July, 26, 1989 Giovanni Andreotti stipulated that ‘in Europe 
being presented by 12 countries, we are looking hopefully to our Eastern 
neighbours”28. Besides, the prime-minister underlined the role of the Italian 
government in fostering political cohesion for these countries via economic 
instruments.  
The minister of foreign relations G. De Michelis stipulated on the impor-
tance of the “Central-European” axis being one of the EU priorities alongside 
with “Western-European” and “Mediterranean” where Italy had more of the 
strategic ambitions. The minister insisted on the priority of the step-by-step 
cooperation with the states of CEE region, starting from economic cooperation 
till cultural, scientific and educations which could, finally, lead to closer 
political cooperation29. Even not being its top priority, the EU enlargement to 
the East was perceived by Italy as partially beneficial process for itself as could 
influence on the geopolitical ambitions of the European powers.  
Fabrizio Tassinari stipulates that EU’s periphery practice played a crucial 
role in developing the practice of “othering” approach towards neighbours30. 
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Primarily, aimed at contributing towards more security circle around EU 
borders, it created further challenges due to EU’s seeing itself as a mission-
taker to spread European integration achievements not taking into con-
sideration the peculiarities of the regions themselves31.  
It is an interesting coincidence that the European Commission appointed 
the same Commission experts in the EU enlargement policy to the East for the 
ENP development. The Wider Europe Таsk Force created in 2003 for the ENP 
elaboration was formed with the experts from General Directorate on 
Enlargement. Such a decision of this Task Force creation was taken during 
Italy’s Presidency in the EU. Prime-Minister of Italy Silvio Berlusconi pre-
sented its own program for the EU’s enlargement policy to the East titled as 
“Wider Europe” where the major focus was trajectored towards Balkan states, 
Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, Israel and Turkey. However, the primarily interests 
for these countries he claimed to be the further prospective of the EU 
accession32. However, during the Presidency, this issue was taken aside due to 
the fact that Italy made a crucial focus on the South-Eastern countries. Such 
conclusions were presented by the minister R. Buttiglione. During its EU 
Presidency, Italy took part in the informal meeting for the ministers from EU 
new member-states and those from Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and Russian 
Federation. This meeting was initiated by Ukraine and conducted in November, 
2003 in Kyiv. The meeting was made in line for the “New Initiative for the EU 
Neighbors” where the ideas of further and wider dialogue principle were 
presented between enlarged EU and member-states. The participants made a 
conclusion that with the enlarged EU, Europe shapes new geopolitical and geo-
economic issues. Understanding new challenges presented by the EU enlar-
gement, the discussion confirmed the participants to see the transformation 
regarding the border of the enlarged EU to the border of the overwhelming 
cooperation with its neighbours.  
Italy’s analytical centers started to conduct joint events in order to 
contribute to the ENP principles explanation. Moreover, it was important to 
organize these meetings with the new EU member-states. It was coinciding 
with one more process characteristic for a period 2004–2006 — EU started to 
develop Country Reports together with Action Plans for the ENP implemen-
tation agenda in Ukraine as well as in other partner countries. In such a way, 
the IPALMO (Institute of the relations between Italy and African countries, 
Latin America, Far and Middle East) together with IAI (Institute of the 
International Relations of Italy) made a joint conference with the Polish 
Institute of International Relations (PISM) half a year after ENP launch, in 
November, 2004. The major conclusions were in determining ENP not as a 
different EU policy but as a CFSP part. Besides, the participants discussed the 
election proceedings in Ukraine33.  
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In general, Italy’s society position towards EU Eastern enlargement was 
diverse. According to the Italy’s foundation “Foundazione Nord-Est”, only 
29.3% of the Italians were regarding EU’s Eastern enlargement as ‘necessary 
and beneficial’. The major threats Italian perceived due to the flows of ‘low-
paid labour force’ from Eastern Europe ready to make a competition on the 
market for the local workers. Moreover, it could contribute to the rising 
unemployment and crime as well as general decrease in the prosperity level 
due to the EU redistribution of funds towards new member-states.  
Such tendencies, in general, marked Italy’s position on Ukrainian Euro-
pean integration aspirations. The elections in Italy with subsequent Prodi’s 
premiership lowered the level of Italy’s support for Ukraine. Italy didn’t simply 
see it realistic to enlarge the EU to Ukraine’s membership in the nearest future. 
Italy perceived ENP as a EU instrument merely focused on the Mediterranean 
region wher Italy had strategic interests. However, it opposed the EU relations 
enhancement referring to the Eastern neighbours of the ENP as a strategy for 
further EU accession.  
The privilege of the Italy and Russia bilateral relations both political and 
economic influenced on the Italy’s general perception of Ukraine’s European 
integration aspirations. Moreover, it becomes evident that Italy stems from the 
need to continue to have mutually beneficial relations between EU and Russia 
at the expense of other Eastern European countries34.  
The ENP initiative comprised 16 countries from various regions and was 
designed to serve as a long-term cooperation framework in the sectors of 
energy, civil society development35. Meanwhile, Eastern partnership, elabo-
rated merely for the countries of the post-Soviet space, didn’t present the 
prospective of the EU accession remaining exclusively enlargement policy 
instrument.  
Ukraine remained apart in the Italian academic discourse as a country of 
the Eastern Partnership countries till the very crisis on its territory. As far as it 
was not Italy’s idea, but a political proposal from Poland and Sweden to the 
neighbouring region next to Russia, Eastern Partnership didn’t have a special 
interest for Italian politicians or participants of civil society36. One of the 
possible explanations comes from the usage of differentiated approach that 
Italy tried to measure various ENP countries and regions integrated there. The 
Eastern Partnership as an Eastern dimension to the ENP was viewed by Italy as 
an outcome to put apart “Southern” dimensions. Thus, it could mean less EU 
funds and more attention to the Eastern borders of the EU. Therefore, Italy 
perceived Eastern Partnership as an instrument not being anchored enough 
within ENP.  
Another explanation of a merely ‘frosty pragmatic’, but, at the same time, 
‘reluctant’ position of Italy towards Eastern dimension of the ENP lied in 
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Italian understanding of Russian negative reaction towards any regional 
formats without its participation or without its leading role in them. This new 
EU policy instrument, on the opinion of Italian experts, was developed as an 
initiative where Russian Federation wasn’t and couldn’t be shaped and, thus, 
Italy could foresee its arduous response37. Franco Frattini, who was Italy’s 
Minister for foreign affairs at the time of ENP and Eastern Partnership launch, 
expressed his idea that EU made a serious mistake to start partnership agr-
eements with neighbours without including Moscow in the discussion38. 
Moreover, under his guidance, already in 2009 Italy tried to advocate on the 
European Union level to invite Russian Federation for the Eastern Partnership 
Summit in Praha39.    
The explanation of such a behavior comes from Italy’s wanting to have 
more privileged relations with the EU regardless its own uncertainties in the 
EU decision-making. Being frequently called as a ‘medium-power’, it was 
affected by a ‘syndrome of marginalization’40. In such a way, Italian experts 
analyze the attempts of its own country to count every opportunity to be 
present regardless its own message delivery41. This tendency was an attempt to 
overcome insecurity produced by the global disorder and new global players 
come to the international scene42. This insecurity is rooted into Italy’s historical 
attempt to compete with other global powers. It happened during World War I 
and World War II when international institutions provided assistance to the 
future Italian Republic43.  
The Eastern Partnership sought to prevent new declining lines by working 
on democracy and good governance, convergence with EU policies and further 
economic integration, energy security and civic engagement. However, such a 
platform list, according to the Italy’s opinion, was more the response to the EU 
tasks in Eastern Europe than coincided with priorities of the participating 
countries. The conditionality principle “more for more, less for less” sought 
countries to facilitate reforms, development and integration throughout the 
region. However, Italy’s experts feared that such a policy could have a reverse 
effect — the declines for the participating countries with the low level of 
democratic development44. 
Serena Giusti explains that the major benefits for Ukraine as a member of 
Eastern Partnership could be seen in the long-term run: cooperation on 
migration policies, visa-free regime, full liberalization and further created of 
the free trade area followed by DCFTA after the AA signing45. Maurizio 
Saccone, Minister of Social Policy of Italy signed together with other EU 
member-states EU Common Declaration during Praha Summit about Eastern 
Partnership launch. Big interest from the part of Italy’s mass media this event 
didn’t have because Italy was preparing for the G8 Presidency to be held in 
July 2009.  
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The initiative to include Russia to Eastern Partnership from Italy was 
influenced by the gas war between Russia and Ukraine in January 2009. It 
proved energy sensitivity and fragility of Europe and importance of Eastern 
partnership countries — Ukraine and Belarus — serving as transit countries, 
and Azerbaijan — as gas supplying country — to the EU energy security 
perceived as pivotal for Italy. Italian academic circles stipulate on the idea that 
through Eastern Partnership mechanism, Ukraine seeks to receive simplified 
and prefential relations with the official Brussels after the start of the 
Association Agreement (AA) negotiations. Moreover, Ukraine was reluctant to 
make progress in the regional dimension of integration crucial for the ENPI 
compliance.  
In February 2010, when Ukraine chose the pro-Russian candidate, Viktor 
Yanukovych, Italy and other EU countries expected the weakening of its pro-
European foreign policy vector. However, the thesis of the President of 
Ukraine on the continuation of the benchmarks for the EU and European 
integration as a consequence of the long-term process of "compromise and 
mutual concessions" reduced the level of Eurosceptic expectations. Yanu-
kovych’s main political idea was perceived by European countries as an 
attempt to make Ukraine a "bridge" between Europe and Russia. Ukraine was 
perceived as a country with dysfunctional governance and contingent economic 
interests presented by oligarchs. Understanding these challenges, it was the 
same period when official Brussels proposed Ukraine to establish a free trade 
zone, sign the Association Agreement and introduce a visa-free regime46. 
Commissioner Stefan Fule also identified seven priorities of the national 
reform agenda (political governance, macro-financial stability, business cli-
mate improvement, mobility, energy security, environmental protection, civil 
aviation). Among 6 European Partnership countries, Ukraine started to nego-
tiate about AA already in 2007 and had substantial results on its way. 
However, negative indexes of the democracy levels speeded down this 
tendency. AA agreement with Ukraine will be initialed only in March, 2012. 
Meanwhile, the negative signals on poor civil society involvement were not 
taken enough into consideration by the EU institutions as well as by EU 
member-states. It foreseen as a low interest in stimulating the transformation of 
the country on the domestic level.  
At the same time, Italian scholars acknowledge that not only Ukraine had a 
variety of challenges while joining to the Eastern Partnership. It was inex-
tricably linked to the global processes, especially those of the word economic 
crisis putting into unstable conditions financial and economic policies. 
Meanwhile, the marker line for global affairs understanding was inevitable and 
unresolved agenda with Russian Federation which was trying to fortify its 
global positions and interests47. The responses of the EU to these challenges 
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were weak and quite ineffective leading to spreading to lack of trust and 
inevitable negative outcomes for the Eastern Partnership effectiveness48.  
Italy’s View of the Eastern Partnership and ENP in post-Crimea 
period 
Professor S. Poli stipulates that the deepening of the ENP cooperation with 
EU has evaluated since its revision in 2011 and 2015. This process can be 
explained not only because of the political conditionality presence. She 
presents the idea that the principles of differentiated integration had a changing 
progress while analyzing ENP agreement with its partner countries. According 
to this idea, the closest form of contractual relations and, thus, cooperation EU 
had with Ukraine analyzing subsequent results of the AA49. The final outcomes 
were that conditionality principle led to the vague perception of ‘enhanced 
agreement’ in the Action plans for Ukraine. However, Ukraine hasn’t even 
received a concrete perspective of the EU membership in the short-term or 
long-term future50.  
The scholar introduces the idea that ENP was modified also due to external 
challenges which, in fact, had an influence in the ENP countries. In order to 
comply with EU policies and ENP agenda, EU introduced new restrictive 
measures with every partner counties not taking into consideration its 
geopolitical challenges and implications51. In such a way, can be explained 
EU’s reaction (lack of reaction) to the Russian aggression on the territory of 
Ukraine when Victor Yanukovych escaped from the country and Russian 
Federation used this momentum in order to illegally annex Crimean peninsula. 
EU member-states were divided in their understanding of the Russian steps on 
the territory of Ukraine.  
According to Giovanna De Maio e Daniele Fattibene, in the two-year 
period 2014–2016, Italy followed a ‘double-track strategy’ referring to the 
conflict in Ukraine. On one hand, it stood together with its Euro-Atlantic allies, 
condemning the violation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity and the annexation 
of Crimea52. As a prove, we can follow the words of Matteo Renzi together 
with his French colleague Francois Hollande expressing the position from the 
West and calling this referendum “illegal and a shame”53. However, on the 
other side, Italy insisted in the EU level not to isolate Russia and make severe 
tension on it54. Moreover, the scholars explain this position leading to a more 
pragmatic and dialogic approach in order to prevent the limits Italian domestic 
damage could possibly have in the future 55. This position evidently comes 
from the need to protect Italy’s fruitful bilateral relations between Italy and 
Russia, especially in what concerns energy supplying. However, it is important 
to mention that the tensions between Ukraine and Russia influenced on the 
ratification by Italy of the AA agreement. It finally happened only in 
December, 201556.  
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Enough of rule of democracy and law was presented by some of the Italian 
Europarlamentarians who considered Crimean referendum legal. Thus, for 
example, Fabrizio Bertot from EPP, claimed that such a referendum was 
conducted in a calm situation and with due respect of the European law. 
Moreover, he added, that ballot boxes were as transparent as in Italy57. Some of 
the Italian mass-media were commenting on the legal effects of the Crimean 
annexation making arguments whether such a step had legal grounds and 
comparing it to the Scottish referendum in the UK58. However, there was even 
a debate in mass-media on the assertion made by Russia of the integration of 
independence of Kosovo as a precedent of what has happened in Crimea. On 
this point, the opinion of Italian lawyers was contrary to the assertion of Russia 
due to several reasons they’ve found incomparable with Kosovo case59.  
Moreover, the possible application by Russia of “Crimean model” to other 
territories of Ukraine was also discussed. In such a way, some of the Italian 
mass-media hypothesed about further possible escalation of Russian aggression 
on the East60. The other mass-media sources focused on the pro-Russian model 
of thinking and even changed the borders of Ukraine marking the borders of 
Crimea belonging to Russia on their maps inside the articles. That was the case 
for the Limes journal when describing Russian military actions in 2015, 
Crimean peninsula was including as an integral part of Russia. The answer of 
the editor-in-chief Lucio Caracciolo to the Ukrainian Ambassador Yevhen 
Perelygin was quite simple in explaining such a reason: the map demonstrated 
ex post facts about Ukraine61.  
Starting from 2014 the EU imposed economic sanctions on trade with 
Russia in specific economic sectors. In March 2015, EU leaders decided to 
tighten up the existing sanctions regime for the full implementation of the 
Minsk agreements scheduled for late December 2015. Since the agreements 
had not been fully implemented by December 31, 2015, the European Council 
is extending economic sanctions every half a year. However, the EU decision 
to impose sanctions against Russia was determined partially due to a strong 
advocacy of the USA. Moreover, the sanction policy touched upon both 
enterprises and selected authorities.  
The sanctions for Russian Federation concerned EU’s primary and 
secondary capital markets for the largest Russian financial institutions owned 
by the state and their subsidiaries as well as the major Russian companies 
active in the energy and defense sectors. The sanctions imposed a ban on 
export-import of the arms trade as well as on the use of goods for military 
purposes62. Furthermore, the sanctions influence on the economic cooperation. 
The implementation of EU bilateral and regional cooperation programs with 
Russia has been reviewed and some programs have been suspended63. The EU 
sanctions were not welcomes by Russia and, of course, it was quite arduous in 
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its willingness to discuss their implications. The following step from Moscow 
was contrasted one — retaliation sanctions on good produced in the EU 
member-states, US and other countries. The ban on products touched upon 
Italian producers and importers to Russia.  
However, according to the idea of Federica Mustilli and Daniel Gros, the 
EU steps to impose exclusively economic sanctions as a reluctant and still the 
unique instrument to react on the Crimean illegal annexation and Donbas 
conflict demonstrates the limits of the EU to use its foreign policy instruments 
only relying on the soft power64. Thus, it can be understood, that with the 
increased differentiated integration approach and at the compense of the 
democratization, EU is trying to survive in promoting stability and security. 
Moreover, the authors come to the conclusion that EU sanctions only slightly 
influence on the trade policy of Russia. EU’s share in the imports didn’t shift 
much65. The share of the Russian imports from Italy has not changed 
dramatically since the sanctions policy imposing the same as the US share in 
the imports of Russian Federation increased as for the 201566. Thus, on 
bilateral level Italy and Russia are having great achievements, especially in the 
energy sector. As an example, in May 2017 during Paolo Gentiloni’s visit to 
Sochi, 6 agreements merely on oil and gas cooperation have been signed. 
Among the important names, Russian Rosneft, from one side, and ENI, Pietro 
Fiorentini, Tecnoclima, PMI Italia, from the other67.  
On the EU level, the Russian aggression against Ukraine forced EU leaders 
to rethink its geopolitical and security situation prompting to develop a new 
comprehensive vision of its foreign and security policy and bring it to a higher 
global level. Thus, in June 2016, EU Global Strategy was launched. It is still 
too short to analyze its outcomes and progress, however, for the first time, EU 
is trying to address its security challenges as a consolidated attempt to protect 
common European future. In such a way, this Global Strategy is trying to 
consolidate various foreign policy views referring to the internal and external 
security policy for EU member-states towards a single vision of the EU’s 
external priorities68.  
For Italy the priority of security dimension is foreseen in the challenges 
that Ukraine is having. The raising uncertainty produced on the Eastern borders 
of Ukraine make not only this country vulnerable, but impact on the stability of 
the regional and international levels69. In the field of energy, Ukraine is being a 
part of the Energy Community where Italy is having a leading role. The 
escalation of the Ukraine-Russia relations since 2014 aggravated energy 
security in the region creating new vulnerabilities on the border of the EU. Italy 
understands the challenges that Russia’s temporary suspension of gas supplies 
in 2006 and 2009 to Ukraine and, thus, to Europe, have for the energy stability 
and security70.  
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Therefore, it initiated Italy-Ukrainian Join Commission on Economic, 
Industrial and Financial cooperation and implemented its visits in 201571. The 
same interests in enhancing mutually beneficial economic relations, especially 
in the field of energy and SME, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Italy 
Vincenzo Amendola expressed during his visit to Kyiv on March, 201772. 
Moreover, Italy provides certain continuity in what concerns energy security 
towards EU Global Strategy goals. Reliability of energy supplies, market 
competitiveness, energy diversification of suppliers, climate protection are the 
aspects for the strategic approach to the Italy and European energy chal-
lenges73.  
As far as the central government hasn’t taken full control of the Eastern 
and South regions, Italian scholars dwell on the continuous predominance of 
security threats and chaos. However, Italy understands that Russia is not going 
to abandon the idea of fomenting separatist movements under the idea of 
national interests to protect Russian-speaking population. Moreover, Italian 
scholars express the true idea that the Eastern part of Ukraine has been turned 
into the grey zone74.  
Italian scholars positively sees the role of its country in the promoting the 
effectiveness of the OSCE in Europe where starting from 2017 Italy is going to 
have its Presidency and Russia is participating in monitoring the ceasefires75. 
However, it didn’t present autonomous initiatives that could strengthen 
NATO’s role in Central and Eastern Europe or advocate projects in order to 
weaken Euro-Atlantic consistency of sanctions. The efforts of the Normandy 
format and the work of Trilateral Contact Group have been strongly supported 
by the Italian government76.  
Analyzing program goals of Italy in the EU from 2013 till 2017, we can 
see a tendency that Italy stands on the need to follow the continuity in what 
concerns South European countries and its long-term support77. One of the 
goals for Italy was to ensure that the programming of the European Neigh-
borhood Instrument (ENPI) for 2014-2020 would also stick to the centrality of 
the Mediterranean region, believing that it is necessary to optimize the use of 
financial resources European Union is providing for the ENP countries78. 
Italy advocated this dimension due to the belief that the main systemic 
challenges and risks to it come from the Mediterranean countries shaping 
North Africa and Middle East. Following Italy’s Presidency in the EU, it 
continues its commitment to further promotion of establishing “healthy” demo-
cracies at the Southern borders of Europe79. Moreover, in 2017 within the 
framework of the priorities set by the EU’s Global Strategy, Italy will continue 
to promote the “new ENP” on the basis of differentiated approach involving 
effectively its Southern countries80. The special focus will be made for Tunis 
and Morocco as far as migration challenges come from these countries. Italy 
Вікторія Вдовиченко 200 
puts into its priority to support the EU funding scheme: 2/3 of the funds — to 
the ENP Southern partners; 1/3 — to the Eastern ENP countries81.  
At the same time, the priorities about continuation of the EU policy 
towards Eastern Partnership and its Italy’s support were not fully realized. Italy 
understands that its special interests in what concerns bilateral relations with 
Russia influenced on its position in the EU about progressing of the Eastern 
Partnership. The Russia’s assertiveness in Ukraine is perceived by Italy as a 
‘medium concern’ and ‘a critical context’ in which Ukraine is operating. In 
continuity of Italy’s EU Presidency in 2014, it will try to cooperate with 
Ukraine as well as other Eastern Partnership countries fostering economic 
integration, political dialoguing in order to promote freedom of movement 
between EU and these countries. This commitment Italy was reaffirmed by 
supporting AA/DCFTA for Ukraine and ratifying it in the Italian Parliament 
chambers82.  
In what concerns Italy’s position on Ukraine, Paolo Gentiloni already in 
2015 underlined the importance of renewing territorial integrity, the applica-
bility of Minsk Agreements. At the same time, institutional reforms in order to 
fight with systemic corruption are more than needed, both economic and 
constitutional. Italy sees the solution of the Donbas conflict only by granting 
autonomy to this conflictuous region83. To be precise, Italy has proposed the 
model of “Valle d’Aosta” and “Trentino Alto Adige” regional building as pos-
sible solutions for Donbas.  
Another challenge coming from the Eastern Parnership countries is related 
to migration. According to the data, about 11% of the non-EU population 
coming to Italy is originally from Eastern Partnership, in particular from Mol-
dova and Ukraine. At the same time the data of 2016 are presenting a slight 
progress of increase of Ukrainians to Italy (1.5%)84. However, the aggravating 
situation with migration comes from Mediterranean partners of the ENP where 
the numbers are 8.6% are for the citizens of Morocco and 2.5% — Egypt and 
Tunis85. These challenges prove the presence of uncontrolled areas or flexi-
bilities in the political decision-making. Romano Prodi argues that the threat 
for Italy in the Mediterranean region remains not in the migration flows 
themselves but that since 2014 they are becoming more and more uncontrolled, 
especially from the Southern flank of ENP countries86.  
Conclusions 
To sum up, as a result of the patchwork policy, ENP wasn’t applicable for 
all the partner countries being geographically and geopolitically diverse. Being 
designed as an outcome of the enlargement policy, ENP as well as its Eastern 
dimension (Eastern Partnership) were not successfully efficient due to their 
inconsistent and heterogeneous nature. Therefore, EU’s approach towards 
addressing Ukraine’s challenges was based on the political conditionality 
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principle but not truly on the differentiation approach enhancing the confusion 
in understanding and valuing relations with Ukraine as a neighboring country. 
EU’s neighborhood policy towards Ukraine lacks a degree of coherence and 
pragmatic foreign policy priorities.  
Secondly, analyzing Italy’s approach to view Ukraine as an ENP country, 
it’s not in the priority list of this country. As far as the driving force of the 
European integration remains economic integration, Italy will prioritize eco-
nomic and especially trade relations not narrowing its views on the sen-
sitiveness of the conflictuous countries. The evolution of the Italy’s position 
towards ENP demonstrated that it is interested in maintaining trade relations on 
the bilateral level both with Ukraine being a part of ENP and Eastern 
Partnership as well as with other countries, such as Russia. At the same time, 
the changing nature of the Italy’s foreign policy in the EU-Russia-Ukraine 
format demonstrated its great reluctance in promoting Eastern Partnership as an 
ENP dimension. Thirdly, Italy is promoting more the Mediterranean countries 
of the ENP due to its leading role in the region. It also means that within the 
EU Italy would like only to increase its role in the South European region and 
thus chart its road ahead to be perceived further more than an EU medium 
power. Such an interest can be explained also by the created ‘ring of fire’ from 
which Italy face related to the challenges of terrorism and migration. 
Therefore, it doesn’t properly advocate policy instruments necessary to be 
discussed on the EU level in order to recharge Eastern Partnership as a project. 
The reluctance to promote ENP in general can be explained financially, when 
Italy promotes the majority of EU funds to be addressed to the Mediterranean 
region, and politically, when since its Eastern Partnership launch, it could 
preview Russia’s negative reaction to it.  
Finally, ENP is now up to the review. From the ‘partnership for demo-
cratization’ it turned into the ‘partnership for challenges and risks’. Moreover, 
the focus on the Eastern Partnership as its Eastern dimension should be more 
balanced as far as EU member states are seeking greater security in the face of 
threats and external challenges. Thus, the imperative should be rooted into the 
common understanding that Europeanization beyond Europe is possible when 
Europe stands politically united in addressing security challenges. 
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